O que é a fenomenologia do evento?
my human gaze never positsmore than one facet of the object, even though by means of horizons it is directed towards all the others. It can never come up against previous appeareances or those presented to other people otherwise than through the intermediary of time and language. If I conceive the image of my own gaze those other which, converging from all directions, explore every corner of the house and define it, I have still only a harmonious and indefinite set o views of the object, but not the object in its plenitude. n the same way, although my present draws into itself time past and time to come, it possesse them only in intention, and even if, for example, the consciousness of my past which I now have seems to me to cover exactly the past as it was, the past which I claim to capturate is not the real past, but my past as I now see it, perhaps after altering it. Similarly in the future I may have a mistaken idea about the present which I no experience. Thus the synthesis of horizons is no more than a presumptive synthesis, operating with certainty and precision only in the immediate vicinity of the object. The remoter surrounding is no longer within my grasp; it is no longer composed of still discernible objects or memories; it is an anonymous horizon now incapable of bringing any precise testimony, and leaving the objec as incomplete and open as it is indeed, in perceptual experience. Through this opening, indeed, the substantiality of the object slips away. If it is to reach perfect density, in other words, if there is to be an absolute object, it will have to consist of an infinite number of different perspectives compressed into a strict co-existence, and to be presented as it were to a host of eyes all engaged in one concerted act of seeing. The house has its water pipes, its floor, perhaps its cracks which are insidiously spreading in the thickness of its ceilings. We never see them, but it has them along with its chimneys and windows which we can see. We shall forget our present perception of the house: every time we are able to compare our memories with the objects to which they refer, we are surprised, even allowing for other sources of error, at the changes which they owe to their own duration. But we still believe that there is a truth about the past; we base our memory on the world’s vast Memory, in which the house has its place as it really was on that day, and which guarantees its being at this moment. Taken in itself – and as an object it demands to be taen thus – the object has nothing cryptic about it; it is completely displayed ad its parts co-exist while our gaze runs from one to another, its present does not cancel its past, nor will its future cancel its present. The positing of the object therefore makes us go beyond the limits of our actual experience which is brought up against and halted by an alien being, with the result that finally experience believes that it extracts all its own teaching from the object. It is this ek-stase of experience which causes all perception to be perception of something. (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 80-81)
Senhoras e senhores, acho que este é um dos parágrafos mais claros explicando fenomenologia que eu já li na minha vida. Na realidade, eu acho que nunca li nada tão informativo sobre o que é fenomenologia, no quê consistem os problemas da fenomenologia, e porque este método é mais interessante que outros para entender a percepção e contrução do mundo do que este livro do Merleau-Ponty.