One would be tempted to find some similarities here between Dewey’s take on experience and Heidegger’s, specially in the relevance of the process of experience as a disclosure/un-disclosure poiesis of the world. This is not the proper place to forward this analysis, but for now it will suffice to say that, as Boisvert puts it, Dewey’s concerns are never far from the moral sphere (p.52), specially when we are dealing with his take on metaphysics. Such is definitely not the case with Heidegger, and this distinction is so sharp that it makes Dewey’s and Heidegger’s take on poiesis completely different. In this sense, it seems that Dewey’s denoting has a methodological difference to Heidegger’s veil-unveilment of sense.
Forms, then, are not part of a ek-static ontology, any pattern of organization is involved in activity and interaction with its environment, in this sense, all events are formed events, and these forms must be interpreted as the results or ends of developmental sequences (p.165). So, Helenistic philosophy is relevant do Dewey’s account of metaphysics, in the context of the thesis defended by Boisvert, insofar it regards  the reality and the atemporality of forms;  the intellectual grasping of forms as paramount for knowledge;  Forms are given as possibilities. The last point advanced by Dewey, would be  Events are not one substance but a plurality of substances. The last point is relevant insofar it constitutes a shift from previous views on ontology and metaphysics. At this point, inquiring plays an important role as the actualization of forms (p.172) that express one form of being. So there are real substances, but they are not absolute, one meaning does not exclude the possibility of emergence of a number of other meanings in the process of inquiry. Being and reality are contextualized. If we have standards and even a notion of optimun, that is because in repetition object become objects-in-question for practical purposes, and the emergence of a new optimum or a new standard is always possible.
Eu não acho que o Dewey chega a fazer uma reviravolta na metafísica do Kant e na releitura desta pelo Hegel, mas o que eu tenho pensado, é que talvez ele não precisasse fazer isso para o projeto dele. Talvez a transformação do paradigma idealista que ele faz a partir da noção de inquiry é muito mais interessante do que o Rorty deu a entender. Não que o Rorty não tenha coisas interessantes, mas não sei se é o clima – ou a água de Carbondale – mas Dewey tem ganhado pontos comigo.
Pode ser pura e simples exaustão.