Justice as fairness tries -to adjudicate between these contending traditions first, by proposing two principles of justice to serve as guidelines for how basic institutions are to realize the values of liberty and equality,and second, by specifying a point of view from which these principles can be seen as more appropriate than other familiar principles of justice to the nature of democratic citizens viewed as free and equal persons.
What it means to view citizens as free and equal persons is, of course, a fundamental question and is discussed in the following sections. What must be shown is that a certain arrangement of the basic structure, certain institutional forms, are more appropriate for realizing the values of liberty and equality when citizens are conceived as such persons, that is (very briefly), as having the requisite powers of moral personality that enable them to participate in society viewed as a system of fair cooperation for mutual advantage. So to continue, the two principles of justice (mentioned above) read as follows:
I . Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal
basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with a similar
scheme for all.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.
Each of these principles applies to a different part of the basic structure; and both are concerned not only with basic rights, liberties, and opportunities, but also with the claims of equality; while the second part of the second principle underwrites the worth of these institutional guarantee. The two principles together, when the first is given priority over the second, regulate the basic institutions which realize these values.
A pergunta, como sempre eh aquela classica: Quem nao concorda com isso? Alguem acha que esta eh uma posicao politica insustentavel? Porque nao devemos buscar este modelo? Que modelo representa uma forma de olhar a esfera publica mais eficiente, mas realista, e sobretudo, que nos tira da tensao entre realismo e anti-realismo?
the aim of justice as fairness as a political conception is practical, and not metaphysical or epistemological. That is, it presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens viewed as free and equal persons. This agreement when securely founded in public political and social attitudes sustains the goods of all persons and associations within a just democratic regime. To secure this agreement we try, so far as we can, to avoid disputed philosophical, as well as disputed moral and religious, questions. We do this not because these questions are unimportant or regarded with indifference, but because we think them too important and recognize that there is no way to resolve them politically. The only alternative to a principle of toleration is the autocratic use of state power. Thus, justice as fairness deliberately stays on the surface, philosophically speaking. Given the profound differences in belief and conceptions of the good at least since the Reformation, we must recognize that, just as on questions of religious and moral doctrine, public agreement on the basic questions of philosophy cannot be obtained without the state’s infringement of basic liberties. Philosophy as the search for truth about an independent metaphysical and moral order cannot, I believe, provide a workable and shared basis for a political conception of justice in a democratic society.
Politico, nao metafisico. A vantagem deste modelo eh que a gente pode trabalhar com ele sem apelar para um nivel mistico ou transcendente. Qual eh a vantagem de falar em termos que tornam a discussao politica impossivel? Ou para “depois”? Nao seria esta saida uma saida facil e um tanto comodista?
Thus, as free persons, citizens claim the right to view their persons as independent from and as not identified with any particular conception of the good, or scheme of final ends. Given their moral power to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good, their public identity as free persons is not affected by changes over time in their conception of the good.
Nao custa dizer de novo: maior. filosofo. politico. do. seculo. XX.
I now take up a point essential to thinking of justice as fairness as a liberal view. Although this conception is a moral conception, it is not, as I have said, intended as a comprehensive moral doctrine. The conception of the citizen as a free and equal person is not a moral ideal to govern all of life, but is rather an ideal belonging to a conception of political justice which is to apply to the basic structure. I emphasize this point because to think otherwise would be incompatible with liberalism as a political doctrine. Recall that as such a doctrine, liberalism assumes that in a constitutional democratic state under modern conditions there are bound to exist conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of the good. This feature characterizes modern culture since the Reformation. Any viable political conception of justice that is not to rely on the autocratic use of state power must recognize this fundamental social fact. This does not mean, of course, that such a conception cannot impose constraints on individuals and associations, but that when it does so, these constraints are accounted for, directly or indirectly, by the requirements of political justice for the basic structure.
Rawls, eh claro, tem seus problemas. Mas precisamos nos confrontar com a realidade de que ele da um campo novo para o jogo politico, e um campo cujas regras sao bem estabelecidas e que permitem a constituicao de um respeito mutuo na esfera publica.
Em outros termos, eh muito mais facil ser Foucaultiano no esquematismo do Rawls, do que no dispositivo de poder do proprio Foucault.
Todas as citacoes sao do texto mais importante da filosofia politica no seculo XX, Justice as Fairness. Na integra no link.