Unity? What unity?
What is involved in the descriptive difference between the physical sign-phenomenon and the meaning-intention which makes into an expression becomes most clear when we turn our attention to the sign qua sign, e.g. to the printed word as such. If we do this, we have an external percept (or external intuitive idea) just like any other, whose object oes its verbal character. If this object again functions as a word, its presentation is wholly altered in character. The word (qua external singular) remains intuitively present, maintains its appearance, but we no longer intend it, it no longer properly is the object of our mental activity. Our interest, our intention, our thought – mere synonyms if taken in sufficient wide senses – point exclusively to the thing meant in the sense-giving act. This means, phenomenologically speaking, that the intuitive presentation, in which the physical appearance of the world is constituted, undergoes an essential phenomenal modification when its object begins to count as an expression.
[O]ne then, in our case, simply speaks of ‘expression’ and of ‘what is expressed’ , of name and thing named, of the steering of attention from one to the other etc. But where the phenomenological interest dominates, we endure the hardship of having to describe phenomenological relationships which we were not normally conscious as objects, and we have also to do our decribing with expressions framed to deal with objects whose appearance lies in the sphere of our normal interests.
H. LU, Vol. II, part I, par. 10.
Onde é que eu tava com a cabeça querendo ler Gramatologia sem ter lido este texto antes, eu realmente não sei. Mas certamente era um lugar desconfortavel, não exatamente o banco trazeiro de um Camry.